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Abstract. 
This paper explores the way in which a family-centered community should approach 
markets and market interactions and the role of markets in promoting a culture of 
responsibility. After making a case for the compatibility of markets and families, the 
paper then looks at one particular family-centered community, the Amish. The Amish 
are a useful example not only because of their success in creating self-reliant, family-
centered communities, but also because they provide a focal point for theoretical attacks 
on strong, independent families and communities by those proposing alternative 
regimes. In particular, this paper looks at the attack against the Amish in the political 
theory of students of John Rawls and demonstrates the incompatibility of family-
centered societies and Rawlsian ideas. It then draws parallels to the thought of 
Habermas and the case of Germany. The paper concludes by drawing some implications 
for a health care policy designed to nurture a family-centered culture of responsibility. 
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The Elements of a Culture of Responsibility 
The principle elements of a culture of responsibility are biological families, 
communities, and market relations governing the interactions of families within 
communities, and of families and communities with one another in society. Each will be 
looked at in turn. 
There are different ways in which to approach the idea of responsibility. 
Individual responsibility requires that each individual bear the costs of his own actions. 
Thus, an individual who takes risks  such as driving at high speeds or buying stock in 
a company  should bear the costs, as well as receive the benefits of those risks. If the 
driver has an accident, he should be responsible for any damage he causes, and if he 
injures himself, he should be required to pay the cost of his medical care. Conversely, 
should an investor’s shares in a company return big gains, he should receive those 
gains, since he bore the risk of loss of his own money.  
This idea of responsibility as individual, however, seems somehow incomplete. 
It is easy to imagine such a man living alone on an island. Without parents to care for, 
children to raise, or neighbors to protect, he would bear responsibility for all his actions, 
but this can only be a limited kind of responsibility. 
A fuller definition of responsibility looks at people, as they normally find 
themselves living together in a group. In this setting, responsibility must in part mean a 
group of people agreeing to share risks among themselves. That is, they share 
responsibility. Although there is much to be said for the notion of individual 
responsibility, since this paper is concerned with policy, it is more appropriate to focus 
on this latter kind of responsibility within a group. A crucial question for health care 
and other policy is determining the basic unit of analysis for such groups.  
Whereas it is not possible to imagine responsibility in the case of a man alone on 
an island, it is possible to imagine a responsible family, exhibiting bioethical and moral 
responsibility, living in isolation on an island. In such a case parents would have 
responsibilities to create, nurture, and educate their children, and children would later 
have responsibilities to care for their elderly parents. Moral decisions on how to allocate   2
scarce resources must be made, including their division among unequal children and 
relatives, and decisions on the appropriate care for sick or injured family members, 
including the dying. In addition, education for responsibility would be a key moral 
obligation of parents, particularly so as to inculcate a proper respect for elders as a key 
to responsible care for the aged.  
It is not surprising, then, that in the West, going back at least as far as Aristotle, 
it has been argued that the primary unit for social analysis is the family. Aristotle writes 
that the basic unit is the male and female couple, who cannot exist apart from one 
another (Politics, 1252a28-1252b20, trans. Rackham). In Greek, the word from which 
the English “economics” is derived is aeconomia, which means “things of the 
household.” Economics as understood in the West, therefore, is at its origin concerned 
with the material well-being of families. Thus, it is perfectly reasonable to posit the 
family as the foundational unit of analysis in a culture of responsibility for economic, 
social, and moral decision-making. 
When we move from mere survival to the question of flourishing, it is clear that 
even families cannot be autarkic, but must interact with others (Aristotle, 1252b20-28). 
Economically, trade among families makes possible a division of labor that allows for 
massive gains in wealth through increased productivity as well as specialization 
according to differentiated talents, interests, and skills (Smith, 1981 [1776], pp. 13-24). 
Such wealth is certainly an important measure of flourishing.  
With regard to moral and bioethical questions, communities are necessary to 
locate and identify appropriate spouses for a family’s children outside their immediate 
biological families. Because children are especially adept at teaching and learning from 
one another, having a moral community allows children to be educated in such a way 
that they learn the values shared by a group of families, either directly through 
schooling, or perhaps even more importantly in other kinds of social interactions with 
the children of other adults in the community. This requires a collection of families 
sharing values and living in close proximity, either physically or through a chain of   3
reliable intermediaries.
1 By extension, therefore, economic, social, and moral life most 
flourishes in moral communities which may have recognizable physical, geographical 
boundaries, or be virtual, such as among the Diasporas of many peoples.  
Whereas it is possible for such communities to exist and function as unified 
economic and moral units, there have been few recent examples of their success over 
even a single generation, much less across several generations.
2 The market provides an 
efficient and peaceful mechanism for mediating the interactions among families and 
communities. Such interaction best occurs in voluntary civil society through market 
exchange.  
Critics of markets often misunderstand them as places in which producers of 
goods, services, and capital meet with consumers to extort as much profit out of them as 
possible. According to this understanding, the interests of consumers could better be 
realized if a central authority took over the productive functions of society  including 
the production of health care  and either distributed its goods according to their 
conception of the needs of consumers or regulated their production and distribution 
according to some optimal formula arrived at by such authorities through central 
planning. 
In his seminal essay “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” Friedrich Hayek (1948 
[1945], pp. 77-91) has shown that such a view fundamentally misunderstands the basic 
problem of economics and the actual role played by markets. According to Hayek, the 
basic problem of economic organization is how rapidly to transmit complex information 
about changes in conditions affecting supply and demand to those who can use it to 
adjust their production or consumption. The problem is that useful economic knowledge 
cannot be captured in aggregate data, but rather is only known  and can only be 
known   by widely dispersed economic agents, in effect, by each producer and 
consumer separately. Since, as was noted above, the fundamental economic unit is the 
                                                   
1 Thus it is fully appropriate, and not unusual, for immigrants to look to their home countries to provide 
guidance and assistance in locating suitable spouses for themselves and their children. 
2 One exception is the Hutterites of North America. A significant element of their success, however, is 
probably due to the strict limitations they place on size, such that each moral/economic unit consists of no 
more than about thirty families. Among their wider communities, economic decision-making is not 
coordinated in any day-to-day way.   4
family, this means that only families have enough economic information to arrive at 
appropriate economic decisions, including decisions about health care.  
How do they communicate this information? The answer, Hayek argues, is by 
means of prices. The price mechanism, according to Hayek, is really an ingenious 
device, discovered accidentally by man, to transmit vast amounts of information about 
economic conditions to those who can make use of it, without requiring any specialized 
knowledge of the specific conditions causing changes in supply and demand to be 
known by more than a few people, or perhaps by any one person at all. As prices 
change, people alter their purchasing habits to adjust in the most appropriate way to 
changes in underlying economic conditions. If a price goes up, it tells them to look for 
substitutes for the good in question. If prices go down, they consider using more of the 
less expensive goods as a substitute for others whose prices have remained the same. 
All each buyer needs to know is what, for him and his family, are the appropriate 
substitute goods, and he can make the best possible decisions, given his circumstances. 
Most importantly, accepting or refusing to buy a good at a given price transmits crucial 
information about scarcity and demand in a better way, Hayek argues, than any other 
system discovered by man. 
Now, if prices are really bits of information about relative scarcity, transmitted 
along the chain from producers to suppliers, what role do markets play? First, markets 
are the places  physical or virtual  in which people come together to engage in 
exchange based upon their desires, given a set of relative prices. This is a very delicate 
process, because those desires are often affected by the prices themselves, so markets 
provide a very intricate feedback mechanism to help people maximize their ability to 
fulfill their (varied) desires. In order for the price mechanism to convey accurate 
information, these prices  and the exchanges that take place based upon them  need 
to be arrived at voluntarily. In any real market, exchange can and will only take place if 
each party believes that the object he receives is of more value to him than the one 
which he is offering in trade. Thus, markets are places in which people come together to 
transmit information by trading things they consider of less value for those they 
consider to be of more value. At the end of every voluntary exchange, although nothing 
new is produced, both parties have increased their wealth, as they understand it. For   5
families to flourish, they must be able to learn about scarcity so as to adjust their own 
consumption, as well as to be able to exchange goods of less value for those of more 
value. For this reason, markets are central to any family or community desiring to 
flourish. Markets in health care are no exception to this general rule. 
In addition to families, communities, and markets, the final element necessary to 
build a culture of responsibility is a reliable system of trust. This might be described as 
the rule of law, and it has two components. 
First, whenever one agrees to engage in an exchange in the marketplace, he must 
trust that others with whom he is trading will reliably uphold their end of the agreement. 
This might be as simple as knowing that when I hand you money to buy a piece of fruit, 
you will, indeed, give me the fruit. Or it might involve very complicated loans and 
promises of paying rent over many years so that I can construct a commercial building 
and pay a long chain of builders and suppliers. In either case, to preserve order, it is 
crucial for a third party to act as a guarantor so that both of us know if you don’t give 
me the fruit, I don’t have to use force to take it from you, but can appeal to that third 
party to do so on my behalf. Although one might imagine situations in which such 
agreements can be enforced without a single central authority, in practice this is the 
responsibility of the state. 
The second element of trust concerns the state itself. In order to calculate risk 
and engage in long-term planning  including intergenerational planning  it is 
important to be able to trust the state not only to enforce contracts among families and 
communities, but also to protect the property of those families and communities from 
one another, as well as from the state itself. That is, for families and communities to 
flourish, the state must not only prevent theft among families, but must also restrain 
itself from taking the property of those families, beyond reasonable
3 taxation and fees. 
This is not only a necessary condition, it is also a sufficient one, and when the state goes 
beyond this, it does so at the cost of a family-centered culture of responsibility.  
                                                   
3 What is reasonable taxation, of course, is subject to dispute. In the West, there is a long tradition which 
argues that taxation up to a rate of 10% is legitimate, but that anything beyond 10% is unacceptable.    6
Alternative Views of a Culture of Responsibility Centered on the Family and 
Community: The Amish 
Many philosophers would prefer that the state, instead of families, play a much 
larger role than that described above and are not hesitant to express their willingness to 
interfere with the responsibility of families and communities to make decisions. They 
argue that their preference for centralized, uniform, democratic schemes for education, 
health care, and care for the elderly justify denying to families and communities 
decision-making authority in these areas. In order to explore just how unfriendly to 
families and communities such political theory can be, I will now explore the 
intolerance of a number of philosophers, followers of John Rawls, to one particular 
community, the Amish of North America.  
The choice of the Amish is designed to be illustrative, but it is not arbitrary. The 
Amish’s unapologetic defense of their right as families and communities to educate 
their children, finance and provide health care for their members and their families, and 
to care for their elderly  the prime elements of any health care policy  make them 
exemplars for those seeking to create a society based around families living out a 
culture of responsibility. Moreover, their stubbornness in the face of outside attacks 
provide considerable evidence of the threat that responsible families and communities 
pose to some worldviews, and in particular to Rawlsian ones. 
The Amish trace their origins to a group of Swiss men and women who, in 1525, 
declared that a moral and religious community should be voluntary, and that entry into 
such a community should not follow automatically upon one’s birth, but rather should 
be entered into only by freely-choosing adults. The generic name for this group is 
“Anabaptist.” Anabaptist communities include not only the Amish but also Mennonites, 
Brethren, and Hutterites. There are about 180,000 Amish living in the United States and 
Canada, mostly in small, farming communities. Although they are often thought of as 
inward-looking, with regard to bioethical issues, they are generous to outsiders. For 
instance, they are avid organ donors, and give blood at levels considerably above that of 
the general population. In addition, as a population that had only about 5,000 members 
in 1900 and that is effectively committed to marriage within the community, they have a   7
remarkably homogenous gene pool, making them useful subjects for studies on genetic 
transmission of disease; they are also generous in donating tissue and blood samples for 
such studies. 
Amish life is built around large, biological families. These families are 
organized in districts, averaging 35 families each. A leader chosen by lot oversees every 
two districts. The Amish exhibit a great deal of responsibility over issues of health care 
for their community (Huntington, 1993, pp. 163-190). Most births occur at home or in 
Amish birthing centers, with many deliveries conducted by unlicensed midwives. The 
Amish provide their children with education through the eighth grade, usually in one-
room Amish schools (Meyers, (1993), pp. 87-108). They avoid buying health insurance, 
but rather self-insure when they need to use outside medical facilities or see doctors. 
With regard to various health care protocols, they generally accept the principles of 
modern medicine,
4 but are reluctant to accept radical measures to prolong life, 
preferring to let nature run its course and to die at home in the care of their family. 
Mentally ill members are integrated into the work of the community if possible, and 
often cared for at home, although the Amish have also begun to establish their own 
facilities to care for the severely mentally ill. In order to care for the elderly, it is 
customary for a special house to be built on the property of one of the children, usually 
the oldest son, where the parents live and are cared for until they die. 
The Amish cultivate such self-sufficiency out of an ethic of voluntary separation 
from society at large. They believe that they can live a better life apart, and in return for 
not bothering others, they insist upon not being bothered themselves. Their relationship 
with society is unidirectional. That is, they are generous in helping strangers, but are 
reluctant to accept outside help, particularly from any government, because they see 
such help as interfering with their family-centered and community-based culture of 
                                                   
4 The Amish apply a kind of moral precautionary principle to health care innovation. That is, rather than 
allowing a new technique or procedure to be used without question, they examine it to see whether it is in 
keeping with their moral values. If they are persuaded that it is, then they will adopt it. Thus, although 
they were initially skeptical about the value of many immunizations, they have been persuaded that it is 
important for public health to do so, and now generally allow themselves to be vaccinated. It is 
interesting that in this case it was important to argue that it would be harmful to others not to be 
vaccinated, and it was in keeping with their desire to be generous in their regard for strangers, rather than 
out of concern for their own safety, that compelled them to accept immunization programs.   8
mutual responsibility.
5 This refusal has brought them into frequent conflict with the 
U.S. government. Here are just a few of the issues with consequences for health care 
policy upon which they have taken principled stands in order to preserve the integrity of 
their communities: 
Social Security: Social Security is the American government program of support 
for the elderly, along with the unemployed, disabled, and a few other categories. The 
program is paid for with taxes specially collected for it, adding up to about 15% of 
income. Although the Amish willingly pay other taxes on property, sales, and income, 
Social Security is particularly troublesome for them because they believe that families 
 and when families are unable, the district or even the Amish community as a whole 
 should be responsible for caring for the elderly, sick, and disabled among them. 
After a long fight, in 1965 they were granted exemption from paying Social Security 
taxes, and in 1978 this was extended to Amish who work as employees. 
Insurance: By extension, the Amish are also reluctant to participate in insurance 
programs of any kind, including health insurance, preferring instead to rely on one 
another in times of need. Instead of commercial insurance, as a matter of moral 
principle, the Amish help each other with donations when a particular family suffers an 
unbearable hardship, whether it be with regard to health, the loss of property due to fire, 
or some other event. Their mutual aid is not only monetary, but also takes the form of 
helping to rebuild barns and houses destroyed by fire or storm, volunteering time to care 
for the sick or disabled, etc. 
Education: Perhaps the most controversial issue with regard to the Amish has 
been their stance on education. Believing that schooling beyond basic education in 
reading, writing, and arithmetic is unnecessary and, moreover, threatening to their 
community, they have insisted that their children generally end their formal education 
after eight years of school and instead concentrate on practical education on their farms 
                                                   
5 This unidirectional ethic can be illustrated in looking at the way they discipline their members, a 
practicing known as “shunning.” When a member violates one of the rules of the community, upon a vote 
of the members, he is “shunned.” This means that he is temporarily considered outside the community. 
During this time, members can offer help and assistance to the shunned member, but cannot accept 
anything  including food, transportation, or marital relations, from that member, until he is restored to 
good standing.   9
or places of business. Because many states have laws mandating children attend school 
until age sixteen or older, this has led to serious disputes with government officials. In 
1972, however, in a case known as Wisconsin v. Yoder, the United States Supreme 
Court sided with the Amish and created a special provision allowing Amish families to 
withdraw their children from school at age fourteen, after the eighth grade. As we will 
see below, this ruling has been widely criticized by Rawlsian political theorists, and this 
issue will serve as an example of why a strongly family-oriented culture is incompatible 
with Rawlsian theory.  
Three additional aspects of the Amish understanding of a culture of 
responsibility based around the family are worth noting. First, the Amish have an 
unusual understanding of decision-making structures.
6 Families are patriarchal. Routine 
community decisions are referred to a leader chosen from among eligible men by lot. 
Important decisions, such as whether to expel a member for disobedience, are reserved 
for the near-unanimous consent of all members, with women having an equal voice with 
men. Outside their communities, however, the Amish generally abstain from any 
involvement in political activity, whether it be voting, suing in courts, or serving in 
government jobs, including in the military. Finally, although they take little or no part in 
the social or political life of wider society, the Amish participate fully in the economic 
life around them. Each family, which usually  consists of several different generations, 
functions as an economic unit. They sometimes use peculiar production methods and 
typically work in agriculture, but they have developed niche markets in cabinetry, 
carpentry, and other skilled crafts. Increasingly, they also work in factories, and 
sometimes own and operate large businesses.  
None of this would be relevant if the Amish were not thriving, or their way of 
life was not considered desirable to their members. Although few outsiders join the 
Amish, and despite the fact that they require their children to live outside the moral 
control of their communities for a period of two to six or more years before they are 
allowed voluntarily to join, today more than 90% of children born of Amish parents do 
voluntarily choose to join, once they are old enough to make a conscious, free choice 
                                                   
6 One should note that each community is self-governing, so that the rules vary somewhat from one group 
of Amish to another.   10
and have had enough experience with the outside world for that choice to be informed. 
By any objective standard, therefore, they provide examples of successful, family-based 
communities which foster and develop a culture of responsibility. 
The ability of the Amish to flourish in the United States has largely rested on a 
combination of the guarantee of their freedom of religion, and basic protections for 
economic freedom. In no way has it relied upon democratic principles. Indeed, as 
mentioned above, although the Amish would be allowed to participate in political 
decision-making (voting and holding office) in the United States, they do not consider 
doing so to be necessary to their way of life, and, indeed, they consider such 
participation to be intrinsically dangerous to the preservation of their communities.
7   
Although it is not the purpose of this paper to develop a robust political theory 
in which family-based communities such as the Amish might flourish, I would only 
point to the idea of a framework society as described by Robert Nozick in his famous 
book, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974) for an example of such a theory.
8 Nozick’s 
essay was a direct response to one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth 
century, John Rawls. Rawls’ early work was intended to design a political and social 
system based around the notion of equality of opportunity. Recognizing that different 
individuals have different innate abilities, Rawls tried to develop a system that would 
guarantee that the places such individuals found in society was dependent entirely upon 
their ability, rather than the result of unfair advantages or disadvantages due to any 
quality except merit. Where differences did exist, social institutions ought to be 
designed so as to mitigate the effects of these differences on social outcomes. 
Students of Rawls have extended his arguments in a number of interesting, but 
ultimately shocking, ways for those who seek to support families. For instance, James 
Fishkin (1983, pp. 50-67) argues that if one truly desires to prevent a child from 
receiving unfair advantages based on accident of birth, one must greatly limit the rights 
of the biological family. This might be done by randomly assigning babies to different  
                                                   
7 Hegel (1991 [1821], p. 295) recognized as much when he said that Anabaptists were members only of 
civil society, not the state. 
8 Another philosopher whose theory is compatible with the Amish is William Galston (1991, 2002).    11
parents, or severely limiting the rights of parents to give their child “unfair” advantages, 
for instance by providing extra help with schoolwork or vacations to culturally and 
historically important places. In so many words, Fishkins suggests that a Rawlsian 
understanding of justice demands radical limitations on the responsibility and liberty of 
families, if not their complete destruction. 
Fishkin does not refer specifically to the Amish, but many other authors do. 
Most of their writings have as a backdrop a rejection of Wisconsin v. Yoder, in which 
the U.S. Supreme Court declared that the Amish did not need to send their children to 
school beyond age fourteen. The arguments against the Amish fall into three categories: 
1) they actively interfere with the ability of the state to expose all children to alternative 
ways of life so that they can make autonomous decisions about how to live; 2) they fail 
to teach children to use “critical reasoning” to evaluate the appropriateness of their 
family’s and community’s values; and 3) the Amish hinder their children from learning 
the skills necessary to participate in the political life of the (democratic) state by 
refusing to allow them to attend more than eight years of school.  
The first part of this argument focuses on the “right” of children to be exposed 
to different worldviews so as to be able to make autonomous decisions about which one 
they prefer. For example, Amy Gutmann (1980, p. 349) argues that the state has a right 
to compel children to attend certain kinds of schools so that they will be exposed to 
different values and worldviews: “A child’s right to compulsory education is a 
precondition to becoming a rational human being and a full citizen of a liberal 
democratic society.” As a result, according to Gutmann, Amish children have a “right” 
to be forced  against their will and that of their parents  to attend certain kinds of 
schools.  
Especially telling for health care policy is Gutmann’s list (1980, p. 356) of 
which rights the state should protect, and which it should deny to children. For instance, 
the state should protect children’s rights to abortion and medical care against their 
family’s wishes, and even their right to leave their families altogether. But the child 
should not be allowed the right to opt out of Gutmann’s educational system. While not   12
stating that it should be rejected, Gutmann (2003, p. 183) implies that Wisconsin v. 
Yoder was mistaken, and rightly recognizes that her system of democratic control over 
education could not be sustained if the rights Wisconsin v. Yoder recognized for the 
Amish were extended to all families. 
Rather than making an argument about being exposed to a wide range of 
choices, Richard Arneson and Ian Shapiro (1996) instead emphasize the requirement 
that democratic citizens be educated in critical reasoning skills so that they can make 
reasoned decisions for themselves and within a democratic polity, including especially 
the decision whether or not to join a group such as the Amish. They argue that the 
Amish aversion to state education is explicitly designed to deny critical reasoning skills 
to their children, and that for this reason, the decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder is 
incompatible with their theory of democratic education.
9  
Areneson and Shapiro’s worry about the Amish avoiding training in a certain 
kind of critical reasoning is only partly out of concern for the freedom of their choice 
whether to join or not join an Amish community. As they write (p. 404), “autonomy and 
democracy go together,” and critical reasoning is also necessary to “participate 
effectively in democratic deliberation.” Therefore, unless the Amish go to high school, 
Areneson and Shapiro worry, they won’t have sufficient reasoning skills to be 
competent to vote and hold office. This is an interesting argument, because given the 
ability of the Amish to engage in other sorts of critical reasoning  from an 
understanding of the nature of genetically inheritable diseases which encourages them 
to participate in biomedical studies, to their ability successfully to compete in 
agricultural production against others using sophisticated farming techniques, it would 
seem that the Amish exhibit some kind of critical reasoning, if not the kind which 
appeals to Areneson and Shapiro. Presumably, then, Areneson and Shapiro have a  
                                                   
9 Arneson and Shapiro base their case that the Amish oppose the teaching of critical reasoning to their 
children on testimony from the case itself, along with a comment in Donald J. Kraybill’s description of 
the Amish, The Riddle of Amish Culture (2001) in which Kraybill argues that Amish children are 
socialized in such a way that when they do decide to join the community, their choice is not meaningfully 
free. This is a strong criticism, and Kraybill’s claim deserves further study. It may be that sociologists 
and philosophers have different understandings of “free,” and one useful place to start would be to 
explore whether the not infrequent choices of Amish children not to join the community are equally 
unfree, and if so how.   13
particular kind of critical reasoning in mind, one which only a very particular kind of 
education can provide. If this is correct, as an alternative to rounding up Amish children 
and carting them off to high school against their will, one might suggest, for example, 
that they establish a “critical reasoning” test which all would-be voters must pass in 
order to vote or hold office. This might, of course, prevent the Amish from voting,
10 but 
since they voluntarily opt out of democratic decision making and political society in 
general anyway, denying them voting rights would not be a severe hardship, nor have 
any kind of detrimental effect on their communities.  
This leads to the question of whether it is possible for Rawlsian liberalism to 
tolerate a family-centered community such as the Amish at all. The answer is, at best, 
reluctantly. Authors such as Areneson, Shapiro and Gutmann accept that the stakes are 
low and the influence of the Amish small enough that it is not worth forcing them to 
change. The same view is held by advocates of Rawls’ later, seemingly more tolerant, 
theory of “political liberalism,” such as Stephen Macedo (1995, pp. 488, 496), who 
argues that one “cannot be entirely happy about accommodating the Amish,” but 
although they shouldn’t be banned, they must “pay a price” for such accommodation. 
Will Kymlicka (2001, p. 170) takes this one step further, arguing explicitly that 
Wisconsin v. Yoder was wrongly decided. Kymlicka also states that since the Amish are 
here and came under certain conditions, they should not be expelled, but demands that 
no similar group be allowed to immigrate again without explicitly giving up their rights 
to family-centered education and related practices. 
By now it should be evident that Rawlsian liberalism is at best in great tension, 
and mostly likely incompatible, with a strong, family-centered culture of responsibility 
as exemplified by the Amish.
11 For many of the same reasons, this is also true of 
Juergen Habermas’s (1993) notion of “discursive democracy” and any other theory 
which requires active, uniform participation in political and social life. The reason is 
                                                   
10 Although it might turn out that on any conceivable, value-neutral test, Amish children might score 
better than average. Thomas Meyers refers to studies that determined that Amish children perform better 
than non-Amish in standardized tests in spelling, word usage, and arithmetic. (1993, p. 105). 
11 Although most of the venom against the Amish focuses on their exemption from schooling, it is fair to 
presume that the same arguments against the Amish in this regard can be extended to their refusal to 
participate in Social Security and other national insurance programs.   14
that such theories place few or no limits on the ability of political bodies to intrude into 
community or family life. Nor do they have an easy way of allowing families and 
communities to make different choices from that of the society as a whole. By not 
ruling out interference in families, they replace family or community responsibilities 
with political solutions to problems such as child-rearing, care for the elderly, and 
health care.
12  
This, finally, takes us back to Hayek’s comments on the dispersal of economic 
knowledge. If the relevant information to make a decision for a family can only be fully 
understood by that family, then submitting such a decision to political debate and 
control cannot produce a better solution than if the family were left to decide according 
to its own procedures. Furthermore, it follows implicitly that if one is no longer allowed 
to make economic decisions, one cannot be held responsible, either. As a result, 
denying families economic responsibility  including responsibility for health care 
decisions and the costs associated with them  makes a culture of responsibility 
impossible to sustain over the long term. 
There are a number of aspects of German culture that, for reasons similar to 
those described above, work against Germany supporting a family-centered culture of 
responsibility. I will simply mention two here: German inheritance law makes it 
difficult  or nearly impossible  for families to make decisions about who should 
inherit what on any basis but that of equality. This not only undermines the authority of 
the family, but also reduces incentives to cultivate responsibility. Second, German 
education law requires what the Rawlsians seek in American education law, namely, it 
prohibits virtually all alternatives to centrally controlled and politically managed 
schools. Under such conditions, it is difficult or impossible to raise children in an ethic 
of responsibility. 
                                                   
12 Moreover, in their effort to arrive at agreement through discursive political procedures, Habermas 
prioritizes thought over action. For a group such as the Amish, however, community life is built around 
deeds and actions, not talk, and to be forced to engage in debate so as to be able to arrive at a political 
solution to some problem is itself a threat to the Amish understanding of responsibility.   15
Freedom for Families and Communities as the Key Element to Fostering a Culture 
of Responsibility 
If a government, then, desires to create an environment that nurtures families 
and communities in a culture of responsibility, what are the key elements it should 
promote? First, as the paper makes clear, of central importance is the creation of an 
institutional framework in which economic decision-making is left to individual 
families or family groups, because they are best able to make use of the decentralized 
knowledge necessary to produce a wealthy and flourishing society. For families to be 
able to make appropriate decisions, they will need a state which protects their property 
not only from theft and other breaches of contract between citizens, but also offers a 
stable environment in which the state itself refrains from interfering with the property 
rights of those citizens, except in predictable, limited, and prudent ways. 
To what models, then, might one look in designing particular policies? Given 
the centrality of economic freedom, a good place to start would be the countries listed at 
the top of one or the other of the Economic Freedom Indices.
13 These two indices use 
slightly different methodology and have somewhat different rankings of countries, but 
generally reach similar conclusions about the economic freedom of various countries. 
Hong Kong is at the top of both lists, but its unique situation vis-à-vis first the UK and 
now China makes it a difficult model to emulate elsewhere. 
The second ranked country Singapore, however, might also offer lessons that 
others might wish to consider. Singapore is an interesting model because in addition to 
having the highest degree of economic freedom in the world outside Hong Kong, it also 
has a policy intentionally designed to foster the preservation of family and community 
responsibility (Tan, 2004). Taxation is low, allowing families to accumulate wealth, and 
wide discretion is given to families in the distribution of inheritance. Education is 
decentralized, and Singapore’s various communities are not required to engage in 
education contrary to their religious and moral beliefs. Furthermore, although there are 
some government safety nets, by and large the constitutional and legal framework of 
                                                   
13 The Fraser Institute in Canada: http://www.freetheworld.com/ and Heritage Foundation in the United 
States: http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/.   16
Singapore encourages communities to engage in mutual aid and support rather than rely 
upon centralized, government insurance for health, welfare, and other social concerns. 
Its laws have been successful in encouraging families and communities to develop 
associations and institutions that are essential to any culture of responsibility. For this 
reason it is fair to say that, in principle at least, whereas family-centered communities 
such as the Amish are under attack in the United States and could not live in Germany, 
they would be at home in the institutional setting offered by Singapore.
14  
 
Health Care Policy for a Culture of Responsibility 
Finally, drawing on the arguments put forward above, what are the most 
important elements specific to health care policy that would be required to foster a 
culture of responsibility? I offer three: 
•  Bioethical decision-making should be left to appropriate community 
and/or family decision-making structures, and economic units (families) 
should bear responsibility for the economic costs of health care. 
•  Risk-sharing (such as with insurance) should appropriately rest at the 
level of moral communities, in which health-relevant (and other) norms are 
best determined. 
•  The institutional structure for health care delivery should use the market 
to provide services, and allow market forces to allocate resources among 
communities.  
                                                   
14 Many in the West are critical of Singapore’s limitations on political rights. As has been mentioned 
above, however, whatever value political rights might have for other purposes, for nurturing a culture of 
responsibility they pale in comparison to economic rights, in which Singapore excels.   17
Conclusion: 
Appropriate structures for a market-based culture of responsibility for health 
care delivery exist in some places, but are under attack by Rawlsians and their allies, in 
the United States, Germany and elsewhere. Most countries around the world are 
rethinking their health care policy and in particular their preferred structures for the 
financing of health. Those which are interested in promoting responsibility can nurture 
a culture of responsibility in health care, if they are willing to allow families and 
communities to be the locus of decision-making and financing of health care, and to 
allow market forces to provide society-level allocation of resources among families and 
communities.   18
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